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5From the ‘Arab Awakening’ 
to the Arab Spring; 
the Post-colonial State 
in the Middle East
Toby Dodge
The consequences of the political turmoil that swept across the Middle East in 2011 support the claim that those twelve months have been the most politically significant in the region 
for over fifty years. The tragic self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in the Tunisian town of Sidi 
Bouzid on December 17, 2010 was not just the final desperate act of an individual ground down 
by state corruption, repression and incompetence. His suicide gave rise to a region-wide wave of 
sympathy, an empathy that was quickly politicised by the mass recognition of his desperation: 
the long-term failure of Arab states to deliver on promises of citizenship, political freedom 
and economic development. Mohamed Bouazizi’s death triggered a powerful movement of 
political mobilisation challenging the governing elites of the Middle East. Within a month this 
movement had forced the Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to seek refuge in Saudi 
Arabia after twetnty-four years of rule. Ten days after his departure, mass demonstrations 
spread to Egypt and dominated the centre of Cairo. Faced with a popular movement of Cairo’s 
youth, the army were reluctant to face public opprobrium and chose not to fire on the crowd. 
By February 11, Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt for thirty years, was forced from office. 
The strength of popular protest was such that two dictators had been driven from office, 
and the remaining ruling elites in Tunisia and Egypt were compelled to hold free and fair 
parliamentary elections in an attempt to meet the democratic demands of its population.
The arrival of democratic government in the Middle East has long been predicted, but, until 2011, 
perennially delayed. Much to the surprise of historians and social scientists, and to the anger of a great 
deal of their own population, the externally imposed, weak and illegitimate post-colonial states of the 
region had proved to be remarkably stable and militantly autonomous in the face of sustained domestic, 
regional and international challenges.
With the exception of Iran in 1979, after the initial phase of post-colonial consolidation it was the 
mid-1980s that saw the first major ‘crisis’ of the Middle Eastern state. This was caused by the collapse 
of the international oil price in 1985 and the failure of import substitution-led industrial growth. 
By the mid-1980s, an economically liberal if not politically democratic breakthrough appeared imminent 
as the capacity of states to deliver on promises of economic and social development came to an end. 
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the fore after the Gulf War of 1990–1. The fall of 
the Berlin Wall, the liberation of Kuwait by US-led 
forces and the increasing influence of the International 
Monetary Fund and the Word Bank were all thought 
to be potential catalysts for change. Sadly, the hopes 
of the early 1990s were not realised. 
Finally, in the aftermath of Al-Qaeda’s attacks in the 
United States on September 11, 2001, a degree of 
hope spread amongst the liberal intelligentsia of 
the Middle East. Discussions amongst democratic 
activists across the region and their colleagues in 
exile in Europe and America were bolstered by an 
optimism that the atrocities committed in New 
York and Washington would act as a catalyst for 
long awaited political change. This liberal optimism 
predicted that the outmoded and anachronistic rulers, 
embarrassing relics from the post-colonial Cold War 
era, would finally succumb to the inexorable forces of 
globalisation. The hoped-for result would see the rise 
of democratic government, eagerly anticipatedlong 
awaited in the salons, diwaniyya and lecture theatres 
of the region. 
To a certain extent the pundits of the liberal diwaniyya 
were not initially disappointed. The administration of 
George W. Bush agreed with their analysis of Middle 
East state autonomy and the need for a muscular 
external stimulus to trigger change across the region. 
However, the results of the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
were unexpected. Regime change in Baghdad did 
send shock waves across the region. But, if anything, 
the chaos and violence that exploded in Iraq in its 
aftermath allowed the rulers in the region to tighten 
their grip, as they could portray themselves as 
guardians of order and stability. 
Against this background, it is the indigenous popular 
movements triggered by the death of Mohamed 
Bouazizi, rather than external catalysts, that have 
had the transformatory effects long awaited across 
the Middle East. Their destabilising dynamics are still 
unfolding in both Libya and Syria. However, these 
movements raise the larger analytical question of why 
did it take so long? Why, until 2011, have the regimes 
of the Middle East been able to defend their autonomy 
in the face of economic failure, international change 
and domestic discontent?
THE RISE OF POST-COLONIAL ARAB STATE
Part of the reason for the longevity of ruling regimes 
across the region rests on the fact that post-colonial 
states of the Middle East entered the international 
system at a specific economic and ideological moment. 
They bear the heritage of this admission both in the 
economic policies the regimes deployed until the 
1980s and in the regime type and leadership method. 
The seizure of the Egyptian state by Gamal Abdel 
Nasser and fellow free officers in 1952 signalled not 
only the abolition of the Egyptian monarchy but also 
the rise of radical republicanism at the heart of the 
Middle Eastern state system. It is the final removal of 
the descendents of this influential regime that makes 
the Arab Spring so historically important.
The republican states of the Mashreq and Maghreb, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya Egypt, Iraq and Syria, strove to 
distance themselves from their former colonial masters 
between the 1950s and 1970s. The independence 
they strove to establish was influenced by the then 
dominant international economic and political trends 
that gave legitimacy, financial support and technical 
assistance to state-driven modernisation across the 
third world. Both Eastern bloc and Western aid 
donors favoured state-led development models, with 
academics in the developing world also encouraged 
the state’s dominance of the economy, as a way of 
increasing the national autonomy of late-industrialising 
countries in the international economy. 
As the Arab post-colonial republican regimes strove 
to consolidate their power, they faced indigenous 
economic classes that lacked the financial power or 
social coherence to pose an effective challenge to 
the state’s dominance of its population. The military 
bureaucrats that now staffed the main institutions of 
the state were comparatively unrestrained by domestic 
interest groups as they attempted to transform society 
by unleashing what Ellen Trimberger aptly described as 
a ‘revolution from above’. Their aim was to ‘modernise’ 
both economy and society without mobilising a mass 
political movement that could threaten their newly 
obtained political power. This strategy of sustained 
demobilisation was broadly successful until 2011.
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regimes in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Syria 
were pragmatic, and implemented in a step-by-step 
manner. However, the economic goals of state-driven 
development served political ends. By intervening 
directly in the economy, by instigating widespread 
land reform in the name of national development, the 
republican regimes directly attacked the foundations 
of the ancien regime and replaced those formerly 
empowered by colonial state building. The policies of 
state-driven development were intended to destroy 
large landowners whose prestige and economic wealth 
had constituted the unstable social base of the previous 
regimes. In addition, by taking the dominant role in the 
economy the republican regimes denied space for an 
indigenous Arab bourgeoisie to gain enough economic 
weight or political influence to challenge the state.
The legacy of this political and economic approach 
was ambiguous to say the least. After taking power, 
the Arab republican states quickly developed all the 
trappings of modern government, with large and 
complex bureaucracies, powerful armies, urbanisation 
and a degree of welfare provision. But, as Nazih 
Ayubi persuasively argued, although they acquired 
the ability to deploy violence frequently against their 
populations, they lacked the institutional capacity 
to extract resources regularly and efficiently in the 
form of taxation. In this sense they were certainly 
‘fierce’ states, but not strong ones. They lacked 
the institutional power and political legitimacy to 
implement government policy effectively and regulate 
society throughout their territory. State intervention 
in society was often unwelcome; regarded by the 
population at best to be a necessary evil and at worst 
as an illegitimate intrusion.
Against this background, the Arab governments 
involved in post-colonial state formation proved 
unable or unwilling to institutionalise legal-rational 
bureaucratic links to their populations. This led to the 
creation of more informal and personal networks of 
social control and mobilisation. Individuals were forced 
to rely on personal contacts with people in positions 
of power in order to guarantee their economic survival 
when state institutions and market mechanisms alike 
failed to provide resources. As a result, neo-patrimonial 
structures of political organisation predominated. 
Clientalism provided the link between the ruling 
elite and its immediate trusted circles and, by way of 
widening circles of patron–client relationships, a sizable 
minority of the population. This system did not link 
politicians with the ‘public’ in a democratic contract 
but tied patrons personally with their associates, clients 
and supporters. 
Neo-patrimonialism as a method of political rule is 
inherently unstable. It is based on unequal access 
to government resources and it constantly creates 
and recreates constituencies of the dispossessed and 
resentful. It was these constituencies that eventually 
united in 2011 to unseat Ben Ali and Mubarak in 
Tunisia and Egypt. However, clientalism does have 
advantages for Middle Eastern leaders who control the 
pinnacle of the neo-patrimonial networks. By the very 
nature of neo-patrimonialism, the relations between 
state and society that it nurtures are unofficial, diffuse 
and for the most part implicit. This means they are 
organic and flexible, changing to suit the needs of 
both patron and client in times of political turmoil or 
economic scarcity. Ultimately, access to state patronage 
has defined the shape of the public sphere across the 
Middle East. Economic opportunities, group loyalties 
and social and political identities have all been shaped 
and reshaped, based upon where a specific individual 
stands in relation to the state-sponsored patronage 
networks that prevailed in the region. 
THE CRISIS OF THE ARAB STATE
The combination of state-driven development policies 
and dependence on neo-patrimonialism to secure the 
political loyalty of key constituencies ensured that 
the economies of Middle Eastern states were shaped 
in the image of the regimes that came to power 
between the 1950s and 1970s. Already modest private 
sector, perceived as economically unviable, were swept 
aside in the name of national development. The state 
gradually took more and more responsibility for the 
economy, moving from a planning and coordinating 
role to direct investment in and management of 
industrial production. This worked well as a strategy for 
increasing regime power, both by integrating potentially 
influential entrepreneurs directly into the state 
and making their success heavily dependent on state 
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performance of the economy. Post-colonial Arab 
governments that promised rapid modernisation in 
return for loyalty were taken at their word. When 
economic success was meagre or non-existent the 
blame was directed at the policy and behaviour of 
the ruling elites.
During the 1980s and 1990s two related phenomena 
arose that placed distinct limits on the political 
autonomy that Arab states had enjoyed for thirty 
years. The first was the growing influence that the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
came to have over the indebted non-oil-producing 
states of the region. By the mid-1980s the Bretton 
Woods institutions insisted that the economies of 
recipient states were ‘structurally adjusted’ as a 
condition for further borrowing. The economies 
of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt all succumbed to the 
prescriptions of market reliance at the heart of the 
neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted by the 
IMF and World Bank. In return for receiving large 
loans those states had to limit their involvement 
in the economy, removing import quotas, cutting 
tariffs and interest rate controls and moving towards 
the privatisation of state industries. Even states like 
Syria that fought hard to maintain control over their 
economic sovereignty had to conform to some extent 
to the new economic zeitgeist in the face of poorly 
performing economies and increasing indebtedness.
The second, and in many ways more shocking, threat 
to the autonomy of Middle Eastern states arose from 
the dynamics of operating in a unipolar world. A 
number of republican regimes – notably Syria and 
Iraq – depended on the Eastern bloc for weapons 
and technology, and more importantly, for diplomatic 
leverage in their relations with Israel, the United States 
and the United Nations. With the sudden demise of 
their Communist allies their international autonomy 
was radically curtailed. Diplomacy became a more 
delicate operation; it had to be carried out unilaterally 
and with a greater sense of vulnerability. 
International threats to the political and economic 
sovereignty of the Middle East were compounded 
by the fall in the price of oil, which had a significant 
effect at the regional level. State-driven development 
strategies pursued from the 1950s onward had been 
directly and indirectly sheltered from the dynamics of 
the global economy by increasing oil wealth and its 
associated inter-Arab aid and worker remittances. 
By the mid-1980s this oil-based autonomy was in 
serious doubt. OPEC had become a victim of its 
own success, as the high cost of oil forced Western 
consumer economies to improve fuel efficiency and 
made exploration for oil in non-OPEC areas more 
cost-efficient. 
The repercussions of the oil price collapse of the mid-
1980s can be gauged by noting the dependence of 
non-oil-producing states on inter-Arab aid and worker 
remittances sent home from the Gulf states. For Syria 
the assistance it received from the oil-producers was 
equal to 25 percent of the state budget. The Middle 
East’s real gross national product in the 1980s fell by 
a yearly average of 2.4 percent. The end of bipolarity, 
the increased power of the IMF and the World Bank 
and the collapse of oil prices placed severe pressure 
on Arab regimes, which were forced to search for 
alternative sources of finance, further limiting their 
capacity for autonomous policymaking.
Domestically, there seemed to be little alternative to the 
neoliberal prescriptions for the socio-economic woes 
facing Middle Eastern states. The failure of the statist 
model was as apparent to Arab populations as to their 
leaderships. Trade imbalances and increasing foreign 
debt forced governments to cut back expenditure, 
further depressing employment and growth. State-
imposed austerity highlighted the structural crisis 
of the economy, the ineffectual nature of previous 
government policy and the state’s dependence on 
external funding. 
The inability of regimes to maintain, let alone improve, 
living standards directly affected their legitimacy. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and its statist ideology 
undermined comparable regional ideologies and liberal 
triumphalism at the end of the Cold War influenced 
domestic Arab political opinion. By the early 1990s, 
in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the 
predictions of proponents of globalisation seemed 
to be justified and the republican regimes of the 
Middle East appeared increasingly anachronistic. State-
driven development had failed to deliver economic 
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Tens of thousands of graduates produced by ambitious 
education programmes were facing a very bleak 
future as urban unemployment increased. The states 
themselves were increasingly indebted and were 
imposing austerity measures to meet balance-of-
payments crises. Food subsidies were cut and the 
Egyptian government faced bread riots. The triumph 
of liberal democracy (if not quite the ‘end of history’ 
predicted by Francis Fukuyama) appeared well-
grounded, even inevitable, and not just the bombastic 
celebration of market capitalism.
TRANSFORMATION POSTPONED
The political and economic transformation of the 
Middle East predicted in the 1990s did not transpire for 
the rest of that decade and well into the new century. 
Although Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia all sustained 
structural adjustment, their leadership remained 
stubbornly in place. The structures of political power 
remained robust after the Cold War ended despite the 
increasing influence of the Washington Consensus. 
Even the retreat of the state from the economic sphere 
was halting and ambiguous. From the 1990s until 
2011, the post-colonial autonomy of Arab leaders 
proved robust in the face of sustained political and 
economic challenges from the international system.
The survival strategies of the Arab ruling elites persisted 
during the 1980s and 1990s because the challenges 
they faced were not constant, homogeneous nor 
wholly indigenous. Regimes muddled through 
successfully by partially or temporarily addressing 
problems in one sphere while ignoring or using 
intimidation in another. Key players in the international 
system could be bought off with limited but well-timed 
diplomatic initiatives.
Egypt’s extended flirtation with restricted economic 
and political liberalisation became both a template 
for others and a warning about the threat to regime 
autonomy if strict limits were not placed on the whole 
process. Egypt’s infitah or economic opening, declared 
in April 1973, was the consequence of state economic 
failure but also of the availability of regional assistance 
and international support. Egypt’s problems sprang 
from the collapse of the statist economic model 
in the mid-1960s and an accompanying foreign 
exchange crisis that effectively brought import 
substitution-led industrial growth to an end. Nasser’s 
successor, Anwar Sadat, saw the opportunity for 
redress by seeking financial investment from the Gulf 
states in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 oil 
price rises. Sadat realigned Egypt’s foreign policy with 
Washington, judging the Americans would be able to 
broker a favourable deal with the IMF and the World 
Bank in return for the strategic alliance he offered.
Domestically, Sadat’s move away from the state’s 
dominance of the economy allowed him to forge a 
new alliance with the entrepreneurial section of the 
upper middle classes. The breaking of landowner 
and bourgeoisie political and economic power under 
Nasser enabled Sadat to integrate a weak, fractured 
and dependent business class into the lowest levels 
of the patronage system without threatening his 
power base. This limited economic liberalisation was 
accompanied by the theatre of elections and the 
installation of a parliament. However, the dangers of 
political and economic liberalisation became apparent 
when the new bourgeoisie developed autonomous 
links with the international economy and social unrest 
flared as a result of the unequal distribution of the 
new financial resources. The ensuing crackdown by 
the state set the template for Egypt’s infitah – slow 
and sporadic economic liberalisation followed by 
authoritarian state action when the process appeared 
to be moving beyond state control.
Egypt’s pioneering if ambiguous experimentation with 
liberalisation accentuated the strategy the majority 
of Arab ruling elites adopted to stay in power. 
They continued to rule from the 1990s through 
to 2011 because they put political survival above 
the welfare of their populations. The post-colonial 
states of the Middle East carefully constructed the 
economic setting within which economic liberalisation 
unfolded. The bourgeoisie, identified by theories of 
liberalisation as the shock troops of reform, were 
highly dependent upon the state. As a consequence, 
until the Arab Spring, political and economic changes 
were successfully managed by incumbent regimes for 
their own ends. Liberalisation was never allowed to 
threaten a regime’s power base or its ability control 
the population.
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The main ambition of the reform process was to 
manage economic imbalances without damaging 
political autonomy. To that end financial resources 
were sought from donors who would minimise 
conditionality. The most attractive source of finance 
was indigenous capital that had been removed from 
the domestic economy in order to escape the reach 
of the state, capital that often belonged to elements 
of the bourgeoisie and landed classes decimated in 
the early years of state-building. Ironically, the very 
regimes that set out to destroy the power of the ancien 
regime in the 1950s and 1960s were by the 1990s 
basing a major element of their survival strategy on 
them. Expatriate capital was welcomed to fill the space 
vacated by the state’s reduction of its own economic 
role, with the hoped-for economic growth produced 
by this new wave of investment meant to lessen the 
social tensions created by government austerity. Yet 
whilst this crony capitalism brought the bourgeoisie 
back into the domestic economy, it heightened their 
dependence on the regime and its maintenance of 
the status quo and further exacerbated inequalities 
of wealth. 
The privatisation process in Algeria, Egypt, Syria 
and Tunisia was thus dominated by a small set of 
businesspeople with close links to the highest echelons 
of the regime. The relationship became symbiotic, 
with those in positions of political power increasingly 
developing private economic interests. This process 
went a step further as the old Nasserist elites in 
Egypt were sidelined in the 1980s and replaced by 
economic technocrats. The change in personnel and in 
government rhetoric was indicative of a realignment in 
the social coalition the regime was based on. The urban 
working class and the peasantry, previously carefully 
mobilised to support the regime, were marginalised 
as the newly empowered bourgeoisie were integrated 
into the regime as subordinate partners, leaving both 
urban and rural populations alienated from the state 
and the ruling elites. 
The ramification of this controlled economic reform 
was the birth of a ‘liberal’ authoritarianism in the 
Middle East during the 1990s. The state surrendered 
some of its economic roles, but only in order to 
consolidate its political position. The ruling coalition 
was broadened and the bourgeoisie were brought 
back in, but having been given a large stake in 
the status quo they were not inclined to push for 
democratisation. Until 2011, elections were held 
and parliaments stocked with representatives who 
debated and passed laws, but the locus of power 
never moved from the presidential palaces as the 
day-to-day management of politics remained largely 
untouched by democratic trappings contrived to please 
the international community. The system created 
glaring inequalities of wealth, increasingly obvious 
government corruption and uneven economic growth. 
For the best part of the three decades preceding 
the Arab Spring a cynical, demobilised population 
struggling to get by in a poorly performing economy 
was constrained by a brutally coercive state.
THE CAUSES OF THE ARAB SPRING
William Quandt has astutely argued that authoritarian 
regimes base their survival on four ingredients: 
‘ideology, repression, payoffs, and elite solidarity’. 
In Tunisia and Egypt the ideological justifications for 
rule had long since failed to have any purchase on 
the population. The acceptance of neoliberal rhetoric 
by the governing elite stripped them of their socialist 
and developmental justification for authoritarian 
rule. In its place they increasingly resorted to a 
conspiratorial nationalism, blaming economic failure 
on a shadowy and shifting coalition of external actors. 
Given Hosni Mubarak’s close working relationship 
with the Israeli government and Egypt’s financial 
dependence on American aid, the use of nationalist 
paranoia as a justification for rule was bound to 
have a limited appeal. This was especially the case 
amongst an increasingly youthful population who 
had no memory of the post-colonial glory of Nasser 
in Egypt or Bourgiba in Tunisia. 
The increasingly brazen nature of regime corruption 
in both Egypt and Tunisia was enabled through the 
exclusion of the majority of the population from 
the economy. Family members of the ruling elite 
flaunted their wealth in the streets of Tunis and Cairo 
as standards of living for the majority of the population 
stagnated. The constituency for revolutionary change 
steadily expanded as the percentage of the population 
between 15 and 29 years-old rose, by 50 percent in 
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Tunisia and 60 percent in Egypt since 1990. Finally, as the membership of the coalition of the dispossessed 
increased, the ability of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes to provide pay-offs was also put under increasing 
pressure. In order to buy off its population the Egyptian government was reportedly spending $3 billion a 
year subsidising the price of bread (Egypt is the world’s largest importer of wheat with Tunisia coming in at 
number seventeen). Through 2007 and 2008 the world price of wheat steadily rose, causing a thirty-seven 
percent increase in the price of bread in Egypt.
Although the death of Mohamed Bouazizi acted as a catalyst for the sustained protest against the formerly 
robust dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and then Libya and Syria, the structural drivers had long been in place. 
Finally, in the face of extended street protests Quandt’s fourth pillar of regime stability, elite solidarity cracked. 
In Tunisia, Ben Ali ordered Rachid Ammar, the head of the army to fire on protestors. With a strategic eye on 
the president’s increasing unpopularity and his own place in any future post-regime change Tunisia Anwar 
refused, and sealed the fate of Ben Ali’s rule. A similar dynamic was soon at work in Egypt, where Field 
Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi refused to order the army to fire on demonstrators, thus guaranteeing 
his survival after the regime change that inevitably followed his refusal to sanction violence.
Unlike the arrival in the Middle East of the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s or the demonstration effect 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of Kuwait in 1989 and 1991, the Arab Spring of 2011 was 
a wholly indigenous movement driven forward by the brave agency of young people in Cairo and Tunisia. 
The contrast between the hesitant, contradictory and reactive approach of the Obama administration and 
the dynamic behaviour of the Arab Street only served to highlight that it was Arabs once again making their 
own history, in spite and not because of the international dynamics that had long been predicted to bring 
change to the region. ■
